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Security dilemmas of the Baltic region
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to provide an analysis of security in the Baltic re-
gion, regarding the decision taken by NATO toward strengthening the security of the 
Baltic region when facing the threat from the East. It looks deeper into geostrategy as 
one of the keys to understand the vagaries of security dilemmas in the Baltic area. The 
article presents a situation analysis from both the Baltic states’ and NATO’s perspec-
tives, having as a background recent actions undertaken by Russia.
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The geostrategic location of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania was always affected by stronger neighbors influencing their drive toward inde-
pendence. The fate of being a part of Russian ‘buffer zone’ was one of 
the factors shaping their political situation, which is still playing a role in 
Kremlin’s drive to rebuild its past empire. The importance of the so-called 
near neighborhood was expressed in the Russian Military Doctrine pub-
lished in December 2014 by defining threats like NATO build-up and ex-
pansion, creation of NATO infrastructure next to Russian borders, desta-
bilization of states or regions, deployment of military units to countries 
bordering Russia, or development of strategic missile defense systems 
(Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, 2014). Therefore, “the 
Russian government defines security along its borders as a top priority” 
(Zakem, Saunders, Antoun, 2015, p. 14) which is linked to allocation of 
resources and is among reasons the West Military District is the most 
powerful one among all the four districts. The pressure from Russia is 
a constant dilemma faced by the Baltic states; however, these small coun-
tries were strong enough to survive as nations, preserving their national 
identity, leading to their emergence from the chaos of history.
120 Anna Antczak, Zdzisław Śliwa ŚSP 3 ’18
The article will try to provide answers to the following questions: 
what is the geostrategic situation in the Baltic region?; what is the atti-
tude of NATO towards the situation in the Baltic states?; and, what is the 
level of security in the Baltic region? The aim of the paper is to provide 
an evaluation of the decision taken by NATO toward strengthening the 
security of the Baltic region when facing the threat from the East. It will 
be achieved by providing an in-depth analysis of the security environ-
ment in the Baltic region with the use of an analysis of the literature, 
observation, comparison to past events and an analysis of the behavior of 
various actors. The article will not be set within any specific theoretical 
framework, as its aim is not to test the analytical usability of any theory, 
but to provide a practical analysis and evaluation of security conditions 
in the Baltic states. The initial assumption is that the decision and actions 
taken by NATO support stronger deterrence against Russia by showing 
unity of effort and cohesion. However, it is obvious that the actions taken 
and military deployments to the three Baltic states and Poland are not 
powerful enough to fully prevent any attempt to occupy the region or 
its parts, taking into consideration the capabilities and speed of possible 
operations (e.g. the Zapad series of exercises conducted in the past few 
years). The situation is not improving, regarding the continuous moderni-
zation of Russian armed forces, which must be faced by stronger presence 
based on a cohesive Alliance approach to security in a broader sense. The 
paper starts with an overall description of the current security situation in 
the region. It continues with actions taken by NATO in order to protect 
its eastern members and later draws a concise picture of the geostrategic 
situation of the Baltic states. It closes with final remarks on possible de-
velopments.
Geostrategic insight
The instability of the eastern neighborhood and unpredictable direc-
tion of Russian foreign policy, as well as the option to use the military 
instrument of power on its borders, both theoretically and in practice, 
is a major concern for the Baltic region and beyond. This is linked 
with the relatively realistic assessment of the security situation by the 
governments of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It is generally assumed 
that a more democratic Russia – if we can use this term – could support 
overall regional stability and beyond. However, if Moscow continues 
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with its non-democratic actions, the security environment will be more 
sensitive with a possibility of collapsing into the nightmare of a new 
Cold War or even actual war. It might even be worth asking if we al-
ready have a new Cold War. The Russian decision in 2015 to withdraw 
from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and to con-
tinue their military build-up on NATO’s eastern flank causes real and 
validated concerns. These are expressed by leaders in the region, but 
also by well-known think-tanks, such as RAND (Shlapak, 2017), the 
Potomac Foundation, Chatham House, and also regional ones such as 
the Center for Security and Strategic Research (Praks, 2015) and such 
researchers as Juri Luik, General (ret.) Wesley Clark or General (ret.) 
Sir Richard Shirreff (Clark, 2016). The reinforcement of the Kalinin-
grad Oblast (creating a highly militarized enclave) raises ‘isolation’ 
concerns, and that factor demonstrates the limited will of Russia to 
move toward cooperation, and rather the drive toward confrontation 
and exerting pressure on democracies located in its vicinity. The con-
stant build-up of Anti Access/Area Denial (AA/AD) capabilities shows 
Russia is enhancing its defensive strength, but it could also be used for 
offensive purposes, by covering attacking units engaged in achieving 
limited objectives. It is essential to keep a close eye on the enlargement 
of AA/AD potential, as “Russia would be capable not just of sealing 
off the Baltic states in the ‘bubble’ that covers air, sea and land dimen-
sions, but also of fiercely contesting other spaces of critical importance 
to military operations – in the electromagnetic spectrum, cyberspace, 
and even outer space by using anti-satellite capabilities” (Clark, 206, 
pp. 12–13).
The military exercise scenarios are varying year by year, and al-
though they are officially limited in scale and are announced as being 
counter-terrorist in nature, the scale, quantity of troops and types of 
equipment do not support such a message. They are clearly aimed at 
presenting Russia’s ability and readiness to plan and execute large scale 
joint operations (within the Collective Security Treaty Organization, but 
rather not with major partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion). The planned utilization of nuclear weapons, the use of nuclear 
submarines, heavy armor formations, strategic aviation and other ‘hard’ 
tools are definitely not aimed at combating terrorists. The creation of 
Tank and Combined Arms Armies and merging brigades into divisions 
shows a growing ability and readiness to conduct operations along sepa-
rate avenues of approach and mobility corridors. The Zapad (Russian 
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for west) 2017 exercises were a demonstration not only of military ca-
pabilities and numbers, as these were just episodes within a sequence 
of other small exercises both before and after them, but also displayed 
Russia’s potential to be part of a bigger scenario played out to a complex 
operational plan. The purposefully shaped propaganda reinforced mes-
sages in Russian society, strengthening its metanarratives. Moreover, 
officially available data is an important part of maskirovka (Russian for 
military deception) to show power and hide real deficiencies and prob-
lems. The modernization of Russia’s armed forces is going slowly, the 
Sukhoi Su-57 is still not in units, the T-14 Armata is not to enter service 
in the expected numbers; the 2S35 Koalitsiya-SV has been postponed 
to 2020; no purchases of major surface navy ships are planned, and 
there are further symptoms of deficiencies. Nevertheless, Russia should 
never be underestimated, as it is a strong regional actor with global 
ambitions. From the military point of view, it possesses a very clear and 
direct chain of command allowing it to start operations at short notice, 
denying time for NATO to react in sufficient force. It is underpinned by 
a National Defense Control Center as “a new mechanism in the opera-
tion of state defense” (Vershinin, 2016, Russia Opens, 2014). It makes 
it possible to monitor the situation in the country and share information 
among all security related national entities, which is key to ensure the 
recognition of early warning indicators and a comprehensive approach 
to national defense using all instruments of power in an orchestrated 
way. Russia is also exercising its ‘hybrid warfare’ instruments to desta-
bilize its neighbors on the one hand and to enhance its own propaganda 
potential on the other.
The nations of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are under constant 
INFOOPS attack aiming to divide and destabilize them internally and 
to isolate externally. All tools are utilized, and this creates an effect 
of constant uncertainty, influencing them all. The evolving scenarios 
extend the uncertainty about Russia’s intentions and create a dilem-
ma about what regional armed forces should be procured to meet the 
threat. Thus, a question arises of whether these countries should be 
ready to face conventional or ‘hybrid threats’? They are different in na-
ture, demanding distinct sets of capabilities and tools to oppose them. 
Is it clear that open aggression would activate Article 5, therefore all 
actions which could not activate Article 5 would cause a dilemma in 
NATO regarding possible reactions, and so Russia can be expected to 
behave in this way. The efficiency of cooperative security is based on 
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involvement and synergy of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but similarly 
on the direct and constant involvement of all NATO allies and external 
actors in building regional stability and peace. Likewise, the security 
of each single nation is based on other countries’ willingness to pay 
the price, bearing in mind that “an increase in one state’s security de-
creases the security of others” (For more about the concept see: Jervis, 
1978, pp. 167–214; and also: Coper, 2012, p. 177). NATO and the EU, 
and their ability to use cohesively all instruments of power in concert to 
minimize threats is intended to produce positive stability and to coun-
terbalance any other actor, especially Russia. The Wales Summit in 
2014 supported the assurance concept, and the Warsaw Summit in 2016 
implemented stronger deterrence actions, with the Enhanced Forward 
Presence (EFP) battalion-size battlegroups as a symbolic component 
of NATO cohesion and involvement in strengthening Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Poland’s sovereignty. The EU is reinforcing sanctions, 
trying to create the political isolation of Russia, due to its understand-
ing of the possible long-term consequences of any conflict escalation 
in the region. Both NATO and the EU understand that any successful 
attempt by Russia to damage the cohesion of these organizations could 
affect their internal solidarity, leading to disintegration and chaos in the 
whole continent and beyond.
NATO attitude
The Wales Summit in 2014 was conducted just a few months after 
the Crimea crisis, which showed the Kremlin’s assertive policy, and its 
ability to exploit any opportunities at short notice. Part of a sovereign 
state was annexed by Russia, but the global reactions were inadequate. 
Furthermore, the enlargement of the NATO Response Force (NRF) and 
creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force – VJTF (Wales 
Summit Declaration, 2016) was decided, to show the enhanced readi-
ness of Western troops, albeit they were still to be assembled. The Bal-
tic states’ perception of the growing Russian threat was not answered 
properly, and was even underestimated. Events proved that assurance 
was not sufficient, and company size units were not powerful enough as 
a deterrent, especially as the crisis in the South (migrant issues) caused 
some nations to be more concerned about that than the war in Ukraine. 
The Baltic states have historical experience of Russia, and so they never 
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overlooked the military threat from the eastern neighborhood. This is 
also linked to the fact that they have credible and reliable expertise re-
garding Russian military capabilities, tactics and techniques. This fact 
is of great significance, and there is an ongoing need for such knowl-
edge. The Warsaw Summit in 2016 pushed the Alliance more toward 
deterrence, although still on a limited scale. To date, NATO member 
states are not able to invest more militarily, and there are real limitations 
of the three Baltic states to host bigger forces. It is also a matter of will, 
based on each single nation’s assessment of the direct threat against 
their national security.
However, it is clear that the Alliance will not be inactive in the case 
of any aggression, which will cause the direct involvement of NATO sol-
diers in the fight. Aggression will evoke a comprehensive reaction from 
NATO, and it will also cause the extension of sanctions against Russia in 
cooperation with the EU. The combination of political isolation, NATO’s 
military capabilities and economic pressure will have a devastating effect 
on the Russian government and society. This would probably be too much 
for the current authorities to handle in the long term. The need to take 
a decisive stand has been promoted especially by the Baltic states, Poland 
and Romania, which have used every occasion during NATO and EU 
meetings to advocate the issue. The Warsaw Summit decision to estab-
lish the Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland (see Fig. 1) with respectively the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Germany and the United States as framework nations, was a step forward 
toward facing the threat (Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 2017). Moreo-
ver, it sent a message to the societies of eastern Europe, confirming the 
cohesion and determination of the Alliance, to enhance belief and trust 
among member nations and to reassure these countries that they will not 
be left alone.
The Enhanced Forward Presence has already been deployed in the 
above-mentioned states, proving the decisiveness of the Alliance. How-
ever, they are still facing command and control issues, logistics difficul-
ties, differing tactical procedures and even language challenges, but their 
presence is linked with a strong political message. The issue is the will 
to preserve the continuity of those rotationally deployed troops when the 
perception of threat starts to diminish. The decision to create the Head-
quarters Multinational Division Southeast was another important factor 
related to enhancing command and control in the region, as that aspect is 
still a challenge.
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Fig. 1. Location of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence units
Source: NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence, US Embassy in Tallinn, Twitter post Oc-
tober 31, 2016.
The NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) concept, initiated during 
the Wales Summit and composed primarily of six NFIUs, was further 
strengthened during the Warsaw Summit by creation of two more NFIUs. 
Their role was to facilitate the deployment of major NATO units and to 
“support collective defence planning, provide expertise and prepare the 
ground for the deployment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force” 
(New Units for the New Challenges, 2017). Thus, they were designed in 
general to prevent conflict, rather than to escalate or provoke it, similarly 
to the EFP. The decisions toward stronger deterrence are to be continued, 
which is recognized by Russia and challenged by confrontational actions. 
The rotational presence does not violate the agreement between NATO 
and Russia signed in 1997 during the NATO Summit, stating that “the Al-
liance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring 
the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforce-
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ment rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat 
forces” (Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 1997). It is also necessary 
to bear in mind that this agreement was signed under a different security 
environment, which was quite specific.
In spite of the decisions mentioned, provocative Russian activities in 
the vicinity of the Baltic states have been continued and even escalated 
after the Warsaw Summit. Selected units from three military districts (Cen-
tral, Western, Southern MDs), North Fleet, Aerospace Forces and Airborne 
Troops were put into full combat readiness at the end of August 2016. It 
was also a precondition for the strategic level command-staff exercise of 
the Southern Military Districts codenamed Caucasus 2016 in which ap-
proximately 12,500 troops were supported by aviation and heavy equip-
ment. The number of soldiers participating in an exercise is always below 
13,000, following the 2011 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Secu-
rity- Building Measures, but other troops are exercising in different loca-
tions and time frames. The scale and the snap activation of Zapad and other 
similar exercises are a clear message directed at NATO, showing that the 
decisions of the Warsaw Summit do not change anything, and that the scale 
of ongoing NATO deployment is minor compared to the real capabilities of 
the Russian Federation. It also puts pressure on NATO, as it again draws 
a picture of Russia as an unpredictable country, ready to further challenge 
the already shaken regional stability. Its military activities, supported by 
ongoing modernization of its armed forces require a consolidated and solid 
response, as every sign of indecisiveness or lack of cohesion within the Al-
liance could be a trigger to execute more than just ‘snap exercises.’ This is 
connected with NATO’s constant presence in the region and possession of 
credible capabilities allowing it to face a possible threat, including the so-
called 60-hours RAND corporation scenario, which conducted war-games, 
and estimated that Russian troops could reach Tallinn and Riga in just 
60 hours (Shlapak, 2016, p. 4). The assessment was based on four factors: 
overall correlation of the ratio of forces; significant Russian advantage in 
tactical and operational firepower; limited maneuverability of NATO forces 
and limited time for NATO airpower to sufficiently combat Russian units 
before they reach their objectives (Shlapak, 2016, pp. 4–6). The military 
scenario is not likely now, but following the New Generation Warfare con-
cept presented by General Gerasimov,1 the threat still exists and refers to 
1 For more about the concepts of the General Valery Gerasimov see: Герасимов, 
2013, and also Thomas, 2016, pp. 16–19.
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other than military instruments of power.2 The exercise Zapad 2017 in Sep-
tember was an element of applying pressure to the whole of Eastern Europe 
by displaying military capabilities and the readiness to initiate operations 
at short notice. Although the focus of attention was on the Belarus part of 
the drills, the major deployments were conducted in the Western Military 
District and in the Arctic (Stormark, 2017). The exercise was also to present 
that Belarus is and will remain a part of the Russian area of influence, and its 
territory is potentially to be used for military operations, which significantly 
complicates the defensibility of NATO, and specifically Poland, putting it 
in a very unfavorable geostrategic position.
Situation in the Baltic states
The Baltic states met their allied commitments by participating in all 
major NATO operations abroad within their limited capabilities, and this 
was also one of the reasons for shifting national resources toward creat-
ing the expeditionary capabilities required to fight arm-in-arm with their 
NATO partners, demonstrating their credibility and reliability. As for now, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are recognized as fragile partners, requiring 
stronger deterrence capabilities and support with respect to collective de-
fense within Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. They deserve such sup-
port, as their failure would also mean the failure of the whole of NATO as 
a security organization which would further destabilize security, not only 
in Europe, but also beyond the region.
The Baltic states are now investing in their military capabilities, de-
veloping armed forces, combat power, reinforcing their territorial de-
fense posture, organizing information campaigns to highlight the risks, 
increasing military budgets, but despite this, they are in no position to 
face the threat alone. They are investing in modernization projects, de-
veloping military infrastructure to improve their Host Nation Support 
capabilities, but they also need to be sponsored strongly by NATO as an 
organization, as it is its common interest both now and in the long-term 
perspective. Examples of developing capabilities are mechanization of 
combat brigades (in spite of the variety of combat platforms used by 
each nation), investment in anti-armor and air defense (short range in all 
2 NATO recognizes four national instruments of power: military, political, eco-
nomic, and civil – MPEC (See: Allied Command, 2013, pp. 1–9).
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countries and mid-range air defense in Lithuania), and an extensive pro-
gram of exercises to improve interoperability. Moreover, strong invest-
ment in territorial defense forces such as the Estonian Defence League 
(Est. Kaitseliit), Latvian National Guard (Lat. Zemessardze) or Lithua-
nian National Defence Volunteer Forces shows their readiness to face 
conventional and unconventional threats and the growing consolidation 
of the societies. In 2015, during a tripartite meeting of Latvian, Lithua-
nian and Estonian Defense Ministers, the three countries recognized 
“the need to develop joint solutions for air defense and unified infra-
structure to support a long-term allied presence in the Baltic countries” 
(Latvia and Lithuania to sign joint defense purchase plan, 2016). The 
following year, the Ministers of Defense of Latvia and Lithuania signed 
a joint communiqué on September 15, 2016, aiming to synchronize the 
procurement of military equipment, which is a step toward the further 
consolidation of their military capabilities and enhancing their common 
defense capabilities.
Cooperation is, however, still an issue, mainly due to the limited 
number of projects planned and executed together, so “the Baltic states 
should reassess the importance of their trilateral cooperation” (Ro-
manovs, Andzans, 2017, p. 22). There were also projects in the past 
involving other countries like Poland, but they have since almost entire-
ly disappeared. The Baltic states must rethink such possibilities, along 
with initiating closer cooperation with their neighbors, as they share 
a common operational space and could share experiences in certain 
fields. As an option, they could share experiences with Poland, which 
is now creating its own Territorial Defense Force. A common regional 
approach and links with Poland are important factors also with respect 
to the so-called Suwalki Gap (Figure 2), which is perceived as “the most 
vulnerable spot in the Western alliance” (Barnes, 2016). The importance 
of Poland for its geostrategic locations is vital in the current security 
setup in the Baltic region. General Ben Hodges, the former commander 
of the United States Army Europe, emphasized this very strongly say-
ing that “Poland has become for the United States Army the centre of 
gravity for everything that we are doing in terms of deterrence” (Poland 
‘centre of gravity’, 2017).
In relation to the Suwalki Gap, he recognized it as one of possible 
hotspots in the current security setup and that “narrow piece of land con-
necting two NATO member states Poland and Lithuania – the Suwalki 
Gap – could potentially be a target of Russian military aggression” (Gri-
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gas, 2016). That term also has historical connotations, but whereas during 
the Cold War “the concept of the ‘Fulda Gap’ was a symbol of Allied 
solidarity in German defense, the ‘Suwalki Gap’ could turn into a symbol 
of the weakness of the West” (Suwalki Gap, 2016; Elak, Śliwa, 2016). 
The other two hotspots mentioned were Syria and Donbas. The real con-
ventional threat could come from the east, and the lack of capabilities to 
face it could even lead to the disintegration of NATO, as the occupation 
of the Suwalki area could cut the Alliance area into pieces. This is vital 
for the Baltic states, and they should not be suppressed by Russia only be-
cause they are small. Since 2004, they have relied on NATO as a security 
organization to fight together and to defend them if necessary. Real deter-
rence, however, requires a long-term vision, and not only among the three 
Baltic states, but also within the whole of NATO. It necessitates a clear 
understanding and consensus of 29 nations by recognizing that regional 
challenges are not really regional in nature, as they are capable of chang-
ing the current security environment in the whole of Europe including 
the possibility of undermining transatlantic relations, which have been 
fundamental for common security.
Fig. 2. The location of the Suwalki Gap in relation to Kaliningrad Oblast
Source: E. Walker, UC Berkeley, Eurasian Geopolitics, Word Press, 29 March 2016, https: 
//eurasiangeopolitics.com/2016/03/29/putins-dilemma-why-pushing-back-against-nato-
encroachment-makes-russias-nato-problem-worse/suwalki-gap/#main, October 22, 2017.
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Conclusion
The initial assumption seems to be confirmed; however, it is obvious 
that the geostrategic position of the Baltic states is extremely difficult, 
and makes them vulnerable to potential Russian attacks. Despite the fact 
that NATO has undertaken some declaratory and real actions to support 
the Baltic states, this may not be enough in the future, especially when it 
comes to cyber-attacks (cyberterrorism). It is also essential that all NATO 
member states cooperate and act coherently, as erosion of NATO’s unity 
may be the greatest threat, not only for the Baltic states, but for all mem-
bers of the alliance.
The situation in the Baltic region is and will remain complex in the 
coming years, as Russia will continue its pragmatic approach to meet-
ing own aims, including maintaining the pressure on individual nations 
and on the Alliance as a whole. Nevertheless, NATO Secretary General, 
Jens Stoltenberg, said: “NATO’s two-track approach toward Russia is the 
right one. We need more defence and more dialogue. NATO is deliver-
ing both” (Opinion piece by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, 
2016). Thus, the forward military presence should be linked to efficient 
dialogue with Russia. Such an approach keeps the door open, but po-
litical discourse must be accompanied by showing real power. Some na-
tions, including Russia, perceive a lack of power as a weakness worth 
exploiting. Such initiatives of the Warsaw Summit as The United States’ 
European Reassurance Initiative, the Transatlantic Capability Enhance-
ment and Training Initiative, UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary 
Force concept (Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 2016), or the Visegrad 
Group’s decision to provide rotational presence are important. Neverthe-
less, Russia is believed to be consuming its reserve funds and will have 
a problem paying its budget deficit, which means that if sanctions are 
not waived, the country may find itself on the edge. However, the im-
provement in the raw materials market allows cautious optimism about 
the Russian economy. Nevertheless, if the economy declines again in the 
future, it will require decisions by the Kremlin, and one of them could be 
linked with playing the military card again. It is hard to predict whether 
this will be in the Caucasus, or Ukraine again, but also the Baltic region 
could be targeted by the use of hybrid tools. Thus, the decisions to support 
the region could have come too late to face the threat, especially as the 
NATO battalions deployed in 2017 are good tools of deterrence, but they 
are not capable of dealing with direct aggression. Standing forces would 
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be a more appropriate solution, but this would require an allocation of 
additional troops and funds from the sending nations, and a significant 
investment by the host nations in the Baltic region to deliver the required 
level of Host Nation Support. There are also limits in terms of operational 
area, as it cannot allow the deployment of major military forces due to 
the limited infrastructure and the size of the area. Moreover, they could 
be cut off from the main NATO area (if the Suwalki Gap is blocked, even 
temporarily). Without support and sustainment, they could be treated as 
hostages and a ‘card to play.’
There are many questions that need an answer regarding the situation 
in Eastern Europe. The last change of NATO Command Structure did 
not introduce a shift of any HQ towards the east to facilitate the con-
solidation of the capabilities to run operations there. Multinational Corps 
North East is undergoing reorganization and transformation into a High 
Readiness Forces HQ and this is a good step, including achieving full op-
erational capabilities by the subordinated NATO Force Integration Units 
(NFIUs). Along with the Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups this 
is a significant and visible footprint showing a real regional focus and 
the importance and validity of NATO’s collective defense decisiveness. 
However, the greatest concern is whether the response is adequate to the 
risk of aggression towards the Baltic states. Is it enough to deter, taking 
into account the whole spectrum of threats? What is the future of the 
US presence and engagement in Europe? Will NATO be ready to deploy 
more forces in the region (e.g. brigade size units) to supplement the three 
Baltic nations’ military capabilities once the infrastructure allows such an 
action? Will all NATO members be ready to continue the current drive 
towards Russia, taking into consideration their particular national inter-
ests? All these questions are still valid and must be answered soon, as they 
are critical for NATO as a security organization to preserve its credibility 
and unity, showing readiness to take decisive steps to support each of its 
member states.
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Dylematy bezpieczeństwa regionu bałtyckiego 
 
Streszczenie
Artykuł ma na celu dostarczenie analizy przestrzeni bezpieczeństwa regionu bał-
tyckiego w świetle decyzji podjętej przez NATO dotyczącej wzmocnienia bezpieczeń-
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stwa państw bałtyckich ze względu na niebezpieczeństwo grożące im od Wschodu. 
Dostarcza analizy sytuacji regionu z geostrategicznego punktu widzenia jako jedne-
go z kluczowych elementów umożliwiających zrozumienie meandrów związanych 
z bezpieczeństwem regionu bałtyckiego. Artykuł prezentuje analizę sytuacji z obu 
perspektyw: państw bałtyckich oraz NATO, mając za tło ostatnie zachowania Rosji.
 
Słowa kluczowe: region bałtycki, bezpieczeństwo, Federacja Rosyjska, NATO, od-
straszanie
